

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the-century security difficulties to force a military makeover, and whether showing "professional respect" to Colombian generals meant in effect administering a technical upgrade to a military system that continues to have serious structural problems? Finally, the August 2010 departure of Uribe and the military cupola who directed his Democratic Security Strategy will eliminate two elements which made Plan Colombia a success. If the post-Uribe political system lapses into a tolerance of "commotion" in Colombia's ungoverned spaces as did its predecessors, while a politicized, risk averse military leadership willing to tolerate serious human rights abuses recaptures command, then Plan Colombia redux may be on the cards.

A final criticism is that a "bottom up" view of the conflict using Spanish language sources could have addressed the twin questions of why Colombia continues to have challenges to state sovereignty and how Plan Colombia and Uribe's Democratic Security Strategy address those problems? It could also have revealed, for instance, important elements that influenced the success of Democratic Security, like the important role of the paramilitary groups in early "military" campaigns against the FARC, which military pressure also exposed as a collection of "accidental guerrillas" whose focus on the coca trade appears to have weakened their military potential.

While U.S. security assistance has undoubtedly enabled Colombian stability, that country is by no means conflict free: a December 2009 International Crisis Group report reveals rising homicide rates, paramilitaries reforming as criminal gangs, a resurgence in FARC terrorist attacks, continued human rights abuses in the security services, and a thriving drug trade, and criticizes the government's overly militarized approach to nation building. All of which may indicate that the future of U.S. security assistance to Colombia may be as bright as has been its past.

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Air Power, Insurgency and the "War on Terror". Edited by Joel Hayward. Cranwell, Lincs., UK: Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009. ISBN 978-0-9552189-6-5. Notes and sources. Pp. 312. Inquiries to <http://airpowerstudies.co.uk>

One of the most contentious issues in combating insurgencies and terrorism is the role of air power. The political, military, and moral complexities associated with the application of air power in waging counter-insurgent (COIN) warfare were highlighted during the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies' "Air Power, Insurgency and the 'War on Terror' Conference." The conference assessed the nature and significance of air power's contributions in the ambiguous strategic environment of irregular conflict commonly depicted as a soldier's war. Out of this conference grew the compilation of fourteen papers presented by authors of various backgrounds, expertise, and perspectives with the objective of re-balancing the analysis to provide a more complete picture of today's major aerial-based counter-insurgency efforts. Dr. Joel Hayward's edited work, *Air Power, Insurgency and the*

War on Terror, successfully presents the foundations of air power's historical, contemporary, and moral relationships to irregular warfare.

Air Power, Insurgency and the "War on Terror" covers counter-irregular campaigns from the early use of aircraft in December 1917 by the Royal Air Corps in Britain's mandated territories to present-day NATO/American operations in Afghanistan. These historical studies of known operations address consistent patterns of interaction between the projection of air power and its effect on waging ambiguous wars. Besides categorizing the challenges such "small wars" pose to air power, each paper analyzes unique attributes that air power brings to the fight as well as the contextual difficulties that air power faced in each war.

After Dr. Hayward's introductory paper setting the tone for the collection of papers, Professor Matthew R. H. Uttley frames the professional argument concerning airmen's competency in understanding the application of air power in the new global insurgency and terrorism strategic environment, a change from conventional application of air power to air power's contribution in fighting the irregular warfare of today.

Several papers reevaluate the RAF experiences in "air controlling" the various indigenous populations from 1919 to 1939, its use of air power during the Malayan Emergency, and the RAF intervention in Greece, 1944-45. For example, Air Commodore Neville Parton emphasizes that the fundamental principle of employing air power in policing "demands a comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the psychology of the enemy and of his customs and characteristics" and, therefore, the RAF actions were governed primarily by political considerations (p. 37). This notion is reiterated by Air Vice-Marshal Peter Dye's paper on the use of air power during operations in South-West Arabia in 1917-1967 which concludes that RAF "air control was about achieving political rather than physical effect", a governing characteristic in all COIN operations (p. 61).

In comparison, Dr. Richard Grossman explains the difficulty of employing air power in counter-insurgent warfare as demonstrated by the U.S. Marine Corps campaign against Sandino insurgents in Nicaragua in 1927-1933. His conclusion that "all forms of military power" employed in COIN risk undermining strategies for "winning the hearts and minds" of the indigenous people appears to distract from his thesis (p. 92).

Most of the papers highlight the moral challenges posed by the use of air power in conducting strikes against insurgent forces intermingled with an indigenous population. Mr. Thomas Withington discusses the Soviet use of air power in its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 and demonstrates how, without a COIN doctrine and with a military subservient to the political policy, Soviet air power failed in its strategy of defeating the Afghanistan insurgents. Doctoral candidate Evelyn Krache Morris readdresses the successes and failures of employing herbicides as part of the "coercion by denial strategy" of Operation Ranch Hand during the Vietnam War. Group Captain Afzal Ashraf asserts that the RAF air control in the Middle East helped to create a militant form of Islam, influencing the ideology of the current Global Salafi Jihad. Dr. Sarah E. Kreps's

analysis of the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, executed by Israeli air power, analyzes how complicated it is to measure the effectiveness of a COIN deterrence and destruction in counter-terror warfare.

Two papers propose interesting applications of air power against terrorism. Dr. Phillip S. Meilinger offers a new paradigm for combating twenty-first century terrorism: "the use of overwhelming air and space power, coupled with SOF (Special Forces), indigenous ground troops, and very robust intelligence assets and C2 (command and control) systems" (p. 185). He also advocates new principles of war to accommodate the challenging form of irregular warfare of the twenty-first century. In a counter argument, Dr. James S. Corum asserts that "while there are no air power solutions to counter-insurgency, there is a certainly a large role for air power" in bringing firepower, transport, reconnaissance and constant presence to the fight (p. 220).

I strongly recommend this work to better understand the characteristics of the relationship between air power and irregular warfare. Individual papers provide thought provoking reading, while the collection of papers provides much needed critical thinking about the relationship of air power to meet the challenges of conducting counter-insurgent operations within the context of irregular warfare and terrorism.

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The Virtual American Empire: War, Faith, and Power. By Edward N. Luttwak. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2009. ISBN 978-1-4128-1039-5. Pp. x, 223. \$49.95.

That Ed Luttwak is a wholly original and provocative scholar is reason enough to pick up this collection of essays. We might paraphrase Napoleon's self-characterization – Luttwak is "a fragment of rock thrown into [scholarly] space." One of his best-known books, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, indisputably broke new ground but was widely criticized by specialists in the field, in part because he was, well, not one of them. But Luttwak forges on like a panzer column, deep into the realms of scholarship and policy, heedless of his flanks. His most recent flirtation with the public eye was something of a disaster – a May 2008 *New York Times* op-ed piece in which he asserted that Barack Obama "was born a Muslim under Muslim law as it is universally understood" and would therefore be regarded throughout the Islamic world as an apostate and a legitimate target for execution. Most Islamic scholars (in the West, at least) denounced this interpretation and Luttwak was duly excoriated on op-ed pages and across the blogosphere. On the other hand, his latest major scholarly work, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*, has earned favorable reviews (see the April 2010 issue of *The Journal of Military History*) and the present volume contains essays extracted from that book or derivative of his research into the eastern Romans. If you haven't yet picked up